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Abstract: In this paper, I discuss the compatibility of heterodox and ecological 
economics. Taking critical realism as a unifying ontology for heterodox 
economics, I argue that there is a radical dissonance between ontological 
presuppositions of ecological economics and heterodox traditions that adopt 
critical realist‘s perspective. The dissonance lies in the need of ecologically 
oriented economic schools to state strict causal regularities in socio-economic 
realm, given the environmental intuitions about the nature of economy and the 
role of materiality and non-human agency in persistence of economic systems. 
The paper uses conceptual apparatus derived from Andrew Brown‘s critique of 
critical realism and Bruno Latour‘s Actor-network-theory. 
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1. Introduction 
In November 2013, the UN‘s climate conference took place in Warsaw, the capital city of 
Poland. Diplomats from merely every country met here to negotiate about new environmental 
policies that could face the reality of climate change. At the same time, Typhoon Haiyan (also 
known as Typhoon Yolanda) made landfall on Philippines – the strongest tropical typhoon 
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ever recorded. The country found itself in major humanitarian crisis, with thousands of 
casualties and devastated civil infrastructure. 
 
What makes this co-occurrence of two events – one obviously political, while another one 
natural – an interesting case in discussing philosophy of economics? Typhoon Haiyan was 
recognized as a direct consequence of ongoing global climate change. Claims about 
connection between human activity and increasing power of super-storms were made by both 
scientific and political authorities.
2
 In relation to economics, the point is clear: our global 
economic regime, based on predatory consumption of fossil fuels, which are basically the 
cornerstone of contemporary industrial activity, can be blamed to be the cause of 
unprecedented disasters.  
 
The story of climate change is pretty well known. The role of industrial production in this 
process is the one of a major polluter. What justifies this proposition? It is an observation of 
the behaviour of Earth‘s climate system and a transposition of collected knowledge about this 
object of scientific study into the predictions of future course of events. Once the causal 
connection between the number of particles of carbon dioxide in an atmosphere and rise of 
global average temperatures is established, it implies a direct incentive for policy-makers. 
 
Now, the relation is clear, concerning at least economy and economics. But what about the 
philosophy of economics? Here is my proposition: events such as Typhoon Haiyan inform us 
about certain ontological properties of real-world economies. More specifically, it supports an 
ontology of economics in which society and nature are not in hierarchical relation, but are 
parts of the same ontological region. It implies also that the boundaries between nature and 
society collapse and the framework which this dual category falls into shows up as an 
inadequate ontological model. In essence, this is a preliminary idea of a picture of reality I 
would like to follow in this paper. 
 
Take this introduction as a sort of an intuition pump. The central focus of this paper lies in a 
more particular issue. What I will be questioning here is a compatibility of critical realism 
with ecological economics. My argument will go roughly as follows.  
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Tony Lawson‘s social ontology can be understood as an attempt to unify various heterodox 
schools of economic thought – including ecological economics. Consequently I argue that in 
case that heterodox economics were really to embrace the critical realism as its own 
paradigmatic theory, it would be in conflict with central pre-analytic vision of ecological 
economics, as formulated e.g. in Spash (2012): economy is an inseparable part of the 
ecosystem in which it is situated (44–45). To me, such a vision has certain ontological 
consequences that conflict with Lawson‘s account of social reality and social agency. 
 
Lawson states that in social world, strict causal regularities of the form ―When X then Y‖ are 
extremely rare (Hirsch & DesRoches 2009, 113–114). However, given the pre-analytic vision 
of ecological economics, we need to presume that strict event regularities are not so rare in the 
socio-economic realm. For example, the following statement is a case of proposing a strict 
regularity: ―Intensification of industrial production in Western (post)industrial countries leads 
to rising levels of CO2 in atmosphere.‖ Another example is: ―An economy cannot grow 
indefinitely in a finite world.‖ In uttering these statements we posit some regularly occurring 
causal relation between economic activity and natural processes. I analyse these statements as 
examples of collective events as defined in Brown (2007). Such statements are typical for 
practically all branches of environmental science and if it were true that they cannot be 
proposed, a huge part of ecological research would lose its relevance. Thus, in ecological 
economics, we need to presuppose the existence of strict regularities in the realm of socio-
economic relationships, contrary to what Lawson proposes.  
 
Moreover, I will go one step further even from Brown‘s own analysis. That is the notion of 
social actor, which is in critical realism too narrow to include some key economic actors – 
notably the non-human parts of the environment in which the economy is situated. For the 
purpose of addressing this issue, the Actor-network-theory (ANT) of Bruno Latour et al. will 
be used. That will also mean to reconsider our notion of nature of socio-economic reality and 
the question of elementary parts of an assemblage of social. 
 
Here is an itinerary of the paper. Section 2 will describe Lawson‘s critique of economic 
mainstream that is connected with an argument against the existence of strict regularities in 
socio-economic realm. In Section 3, I will briefly sketch the minimum of ecological 
economics. The following Section 4 will present Andrew Brown‘s notion of collective events, 
which will open up the possibility of proposing strict event regularities in economics anew. 
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Further discussion of Lawson‘s as well as Brown‘s own ontology will take place in Section 5, 
where the perspective of ANT will be introduced. Concluding Section 6 will point at the 
modernist notion of science and the blurring boundaries between nature and culture. 
 
 
2. Critical Realism 
The philosophical school of critical realism proposes a social ontology that leaves the 
methodology of mainstream economics inadequate. Economic mainstream studies the realm 
of socio-economic relationships by means of formal-deductive method that does not meet the 
nature of the object of its interest. So why discuss critical realism if its general idea is 
consonant with ecological economics? I find two main motifs for such a debate: 
 
1) Lawson (2006) proposes critical realism as a unifying philosophical paradigm for 
heterodox economics (484). Besides post-Keynesian, feminist or Marxist economics, 
the contemporary ecological economics can be equally included under this umbrella 
term. Critical realism is meant to provide solid ontological and methodological 
groundings for all these various economic studies. That could be seen as something 
worth of our interest, for nowadays schools of ecological economics seem to rest in 
unstructured methodological pluralism, eclectics and overproduction of puzzling and 
contradictory presuppositions (Spash 2012, 40). 
2) Critical realism has already been a trending issue also in ecological economics, and in 
some sciences, such as critical management studies or human geography, it became 
one of the dominant paradigmatic theories (Hirsch & DesRoches 2009, 103). Hence 
the critical discussion should add some limits to what extent the critical realism is 
applicable in ecological economics. 
 
As mentioned before, Lawson in principle criticizes mainstream economics for being 
ultimately exclusive in relation to any other method than quantitative, formal-deductive 
method of econometrics.
3
 He traces this insistence back to the three interconnected 
propositions mainstream economics rests upon: 
 
                                                 
3 According to Lawson (2006), this is to be counted as the definition of mainstream economics: ―... the 
mainstream project of modern economics just is an insistence, as a discipline-wide principle, that economic 
phenomena be investigated using only certain mathematical–deductive forms of reasoning‖ (492). 
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1) Event regularities: Formal-deductive models presuppose the existence of strict causal 
regularities in social world of the form ―If A, then B always follows‖ (Hirsch & 
DesRoches 2009, 113). 
2) Isolated atoms: The causal explanations of economic phenomena can be formulated in 
terms of ―isolated atoms‖. These isolated events or objects can be represented as 
factors that are elements of the causal nexus (Ibid). 
3) System isolation: „… if the factor is triggered—this triggering is the first event—the 
same outcome, the second event, always follows, so long as nothing interferes. It is the 
assumption of system isolation that guarantees that nothing does interfere― (Ibid). 
 
These premises imply that econometrics is an ontologically inadequate method for economic 
science, granted that social reality is to be treated as emergent ontological region, 
characterised as dynamic, processual, continually reproduced and transformed by social 
practice, structured, meaningful and valuable (Lawson 2006, 495–496). It follows that „... 
social reality is found not to comprise parts that are isolated, for more or less everything seems 
to be constituted in relation to other things. And components cannot be treated as atomistic or 
stable, for each is being continually transformed― (Hirsch & DesRoches 2009, 114). This 
conclusion is supported by our a posteriori observation of recurring failures of successful 
predictions by mainstream economics. 
 
A system that displays causal regularities needs to be closed according to critical realism. It 
means that it posits both intrinsic and extrinsic closure: 
 
1) Intrinsic closure: ―… the given event must always follow from the mechanism x…‖ 
(Morgan 2014, 9). 
2) Extrinsic closure: ―… the system must be separated from external influences…‖ 
(Ibid). 
 
Such a notion should be better described as a notion of isolated system and has one 
unfortunate consequence, namely that this kind of system can‘t be studied by external 
observer, because all causal connections with the environment are broken. I will come back to 
this feature later. Now, it is important to point at the complementary notion to the concept of 
isolated system – an open system: ―An open system is one in which there are many generative 
mechanisms and thus the continual possibility that similar events are brought about through 
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different mixes, and where there is also the converse possibility that variations in events may 
occur because of different mixes‖ (Morgan 2014, 10–11). Socio-economic realm is a case of 
an open system and it follows that genuine strict regularities – similar to the iron causal rules 
of nature – do not occur here. 
 
 
3. Ecological Economics 
As probably in all recently emerged disciplines, the standard definition of what is ecological 
economics is not yet established. However, we can trace several key features that shape this 
field of study as a separate scientific discipline. Following some key authors – such as Clive 
Spash, Inge Røpke or Silvio Funtowicz – the mostly agreed characteristics of ecological 
economics are these fives: 
 
1) Insistence on ethical dimension of economic practices (Spash 1999, 413; Spash 2012, 
45; Funtowicz & Ravetz 1993, 205). 
2) Intertwining natural and social sciences in order to describe the interconnections 
between human actions and ecosystem mechanisms (Spash 1999, 424; Røpke 2004, 
294). 
3) Inspiration from other heterodox traditions in economics, such as institutional, 
Marxist or feminist economics (Spash 1999, 413). 
4) Strong orientation on policy-making, which is a consequence of conscious normative 
groundings of ecological economics (Spash 1999, 425; Spash 2012, 45; Funtowicz & 
Ravetz 1993, 206). 
5) Irreducible value pluralism, that is essential in grasping the problems of democratic 
negotiation of environmental policies (Spash 1999, 425). 
 
These characteristics spring from the general intuition of ecological economics, as formulated 
in Røpke (2004): 
 
―The basic observation in ecological economics is banal and difficult to 
disagree with: the human economy is embedded in nature, and economic 
processes are also always natural processes in the sense that they can be seen as 
biological, physical and chemical processes and transformations… The basic 
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idea of what becomes ecological economics is that the economy ought to be 
studied also, but not only, as a natural object, and that economic processes 
should consequently also be conceptualized in terms usually used to describe 
processes in nature‖ (294). 
 
Spash (2012) and Johanisová (2014) coined this proposition (italics in quotation above) as a 
pre-analytic vision of ecological economics. 
Let me show now how the analytic apparatus of this discipline usually looks like. We can start 
from the distinction made by Nicolas Georgescu-Roegen between three elements of economy: 
stocks, funds and flows. Imagine the economy as a giant organism that has certain inputs and 
certain outputs. In such a system, materials and energy flow through it. The inputs can be 
sorted into two categories. An input of the first type is a fund. The most common fund is solar 
energy, which is always used only at the particular rate (i.e. it is not a subject of depletion) 
and as such it cannot be stockpiled without being captured in some specific energy carrier. 
The second type is a stock, which means (besides other characteristics) that it can be 
stockpiled and once entering the system, it is a subject of various transformations and can be 
depleted (the rate of extraction is not limited by the nature of the resource). Stocks are 
basically the sources of energy carriers, such as oil, gas or coal. Given these definitions, a 




How the economy in this model looks like? In case of Earth‘s ecosystem, the primary fund is 
solar energy (Georgescu-Roegen 1975, 369; Boulding 1966, 5). This energy is used by 
various strategies, e. g. photosynthesis in case of some living organisms. In limiting cases, it 
can be trapped for some time. That is a case of fossil fuels, which are virtually the rays of sun 
caught in the organic material that was accumulated under the surface for hundreds of 
millions of years (Kerschner 2010, 546). Now, this is the situation when a stock is created. It 
carries the initial solar energy that can be unleashed by series of activities, such as combustion 
in our case of oil. Moreover, it can be materially transformed (e.g. oil can be converted into 
numerous types of plastics). 
 
From this point of view, economy does not seem to be a closed cycle of money and 
commodities between the sides of supply and demand. Instead, a picture of organic 
                                                 
4 According to Daly & Farley (2011, 70–72). See also Scheidel & Sorman (2012, 589–590). 
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metabolism arises. It is particularly important to stress the fact that ecological economics 
includes biophysical processes as central to the existence of economy. What we end up with is 
a picture of economic analysis as analysis of material and energy flows through the system. 
As the matter of fact, economy is a system of material processes and it ought to be studied in 
this respect (Georgescu-Roegen 1975, 350). 
 
As we can see, ecological economics balances between natural and social scientific approach. 
It frequently crosses the borders between realms of physical reality and social constructions, 
in order to include all objects that count in real-world economy for the purpose of adequate 
explanation of this structure. It follows that sometimes, ecological economics states 
propositions claiming strict causal regularities of the form ―When X than Y‖, as in the case of 
the platitude that we cannot grow indefinitely in a finite world.
5
 Such a general assertion is a 
hidden declaration of causal relation between growth of economy and the stability/resilience 
of global ecosystem – the more growth you have, so worse for the ecosystem. Taking 
ecosystem stability and resilience as central abilities for its defence against disrupting 
exogenous factors, growth of economy increases stability but lowers the resilience of the 
system, i.e. it leaves the system vulnerable to exogenous factors and also uncovers structural 
problems that are in many cases just accidents waiting to happen (Holling 1986, 296–297; 
308; 311). 
 
Growth of economy as an imperative of capitalism is intrinsically connected with existence of 
cheap and accessible energy resources (Hall & Murphy 2011, 52). That brings us back to 
fossil fuels. Evidence from energy studies, namely in papers concerning Peak-Oil, suggests 
another causal regularity within current economic system – the predominant depletion of 
fossil fuels that is a necessary precondition to maintain capitalism, that can easily turn to be its 
Achilles‘ heel, as energy efficiency of extraction of resources stagnates (Kerschner et al. 
2013, 1424–1425; Kerschner 2015, 131). 
 
 
4. Collective events 
Now, what‘s the drawback of exorcizing strict regularities from social reality, as critical 
realism attempts for? In general, the problem is that the assemblage of social sticks together 
                                                 
5 See e. g. Boulding (1966) 
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by practice of actors that are mobilised in the social networks. It is not an abstract structure 
imposed on material world – social structure is continuously produced, shaped and re-shaped 
in practices situated in the material world. As Latour (2007) would say, it is not some special 
stuff driven by special social forces (1), as ether in Aristotelian universe, which guaranteed 
the revolution of celestial bodies around the Earth, granted its inherent ability of circular 
motion. 
 
This ontological vision is justified by Wittgenstein‘s argument in his late work On Certainty, 
where he discusses the connection between rule and its practice. The point is that – according 
to Wittgenstein – the way a rule is established is essentially a certain practice that serves 
afterwards as a paradigm (or precedent) that is to be followed. The practice itself thus shows 
us the rules to be governed by in reproduction of this practice. That is for example a case of 
making a judgement: „We use judgments as principles of judgment― (Wittgenstein 1969, 
125). Another case can be calculating: ―If you demand a rule from which it follows that there 
can't have been a miscalculation… the answer is that we did not learn this through a rule, but 
by learning to calculate. We got to know the nature of calculating by learning to calculate… 
This is how one calculates. Calculating is this. What we learn at school, for example.‖ 
(Wittgenstein 1969, 50). So to speak, we cannot distinguish between rule and its application, 
or in other words between norms and practices. 
 
Some pages later, Wittgenstein adds:  
 
„139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. 
Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself. 
 
140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning 
rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A 
totality of judgments is made plausible to us― (Wittgenstein 1969, 145). 
 
Justification of following certain rule thus ends up in blind practice, which is a position 
similar to his discussion of rule-following paradox in Philosophical Investigations 
(Wittgenstein 1997, 85e). To use some sociologic terminology – discursive practices are 
mounted through non-discursive practices: 
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―28. What is 'learning a rule'? – This. What is 'making a mistake in applying it'? 
– This. And what is pointed to here is something indeterminate. 
 
29: Practice in the use of the rule also shews what is a mistake in its 
employment‖ (Wittgenstein 1969, 35). 
 
Wittgenstein‘s argument is similar to Brown‘s own position. According to him, social 
structures, practices and relations cannot be distinguished from each other (Brown 2007, 500; 
513–514). As we will see later, this thesis conforms also to an ontological vision formulated 
by Bruno Latour. 
 
Now, everyone would probably agree that social norms are parts of social system. However, 
these norms exist only in practice and so the system as such persists as long as an activity of 
following certain rules occurs. A recurrence of certain practice in predominant population of 
social actors is thus a necessary condition for persistence of given socio-economic system, or 
– as Brown (2007) would say – an organic necessity of the system (510). To grasp the socio-
economic network adequately, we have to give an account of key causal regularities that are 
reproduced in the system. 
 
What are the features of these regularities? To describe them, I will use Andrew Brown‘s 
peculiar notion of collective event. Brown introduces this concept in his critique of critical 
realism from the perspective of systematic dialectics. He tries to show that ―the contemporary 
economic system displays many strict event regularities, and is in this sense ‗closed‘ contra 
critical realism‖ (Brown 2007, 501). 
 
The definition of collective event is the following one: 
 
―When taking a system-wide, historical perspective on capitalism, an 
[collective] ‗event‘ is defined over a collection of individuals across the 
capitalist system… as follows: ‗many individuals go to work for a wage‘, 
‗many capitalist firms produce in order to make profit‘, ‗there is ubiquitous 
buying and selling of commodities‘… Collectively defined events 
characteristic of capitalism (henceforth termed ‗collective events‘), so 
formulated, could also be termed ‗states of affairs‘‖ (Brown 2007, 508). 
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It is important to stress that collective events are detectable only at system-wide perspective. 
Brown acknowledges that from a first person view, critical realist‘s perspective seems to be 
correct, because a single man cannot grasp the system at large – in his immediate context, 
reality can seem to be pretty irregular (Brown 2007, 508). But once we abandon an individual 
perspective, collective events are traceable in given social system. What are the characteristic 
features of such events? Here we can list these four: 
 
1) Collective events are empirically unobservable, i.e. we never see many individuals 
going to work, but always only some small subset of individuals at given 
spatiotemporal coordinates. 
2) They typically appear during a longer period of time. 
3) An utterance of collective event is indicated by operators as ―many‖, ―large‖, 
―predominant‖ etc. 





For example, to make the capitalist system viable, the transaction of commodities at certain 
level has to be the case. Another case is the depletion of cheap and accessible energy 
resources mentioned in Section 3. Certain practices need to be conducted in sufficiently large 
amount in order to preserve the system. Thus to state that we live in capitalism means to bind 
oneself to some ontological assumptions – namely that there are regularly occurring events. It 
means that we propose a self-reproducing mechanism, verbalized as an assertion of strict 
causal regularity of the form ―When X then Y‖, or to be more concrete, of the form ―When 
C(t) then C(t+1)‖, where C is a collective event and t is a period when C occurrs (Brown 
2007, 510). That is clear a case of fossil fuel extraction in capitalism – to maintain the 
capitalism, and thus also to maintain an extraction of fossil fuels at t+1, the predominant 
extraction of fossil fuels at t must be the case. To extract an energy resource, you need some 
energy – and that energy can be gained only by extraction of a resource in a preceding period 
of time (Kerschner 2014, 131). 
 
                                                 
6 According to Brown (2007, 508–509). 
Lukáš Likavčan: Reconsidering critical realism: an environmentalist’s perspective 
12 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
Collective events are precisely what is grasped in analysis of ecological economics. Claiming 
for example that an economic growth is associated with the relative growth in extraction of 
main energy resources (Hall & Murphy 2011, 54) is not to assert mere correlation, but a 
concatenation of collective events explicable as causal regularity. Blurring the boundaries 
between natural and social sciences in study of socio-economic system, manifested also in 
pre-analytic vision of ecological economics, enables to formulate strict event regularities, 
because an ontological realm of social reality is inseparable from nature. This inseparability 
of social and natural can be clearly seen in ecological economic analysis, where socio-
economic system is driven by forces of thermodynamics and is bounded by principal 
mechanisms of global ecosystem. 
 
Economy is thus not an open system, but a closed system (Boulding 1966, 4–5). What does it 
mean? First of all, we have to distinguish between closed and isolated systems. A system 
which is isolated is a one that has no causal connections with its environment. In practice, it 
means that we cannot know about the existence of such system. On contrary, a closed system 
can be localised in space and time and is causally connected with its surroundings. In terms of 
ecological economics, it means that a closed system has inputs and outputs – flows of energy 
entering and leaving the system. Closed system is nevertheless distinguishable from the 
environment as a certain body of mass, i.e. it has material borders. Using the terminology of 
critical realism, closed systems posit intrinsic, but not extrinsic closures (Morgan 2014, 9). 
Nevertheless, causal conjunctions of two events occur in them, because they are intertwined 
with biophysical reality, which is subjected to causal regularities. 
 
To sum up this section, from environmental perspective, economy is not only embedded in, 
interfering with or connected to ecosystem, it is a genuine part of the ecosystem itself. As far 
as the ecosystem is assembled from natural, biophysical objects, it follows that economic 
relations and activities are also biophysical in their nature. And when we say biophysical, we 
say behaving in a way that displays certain strict event regularities understood as collective 
events. Thus, to conduct ecological economic research means to formulate strict regularities, 
if one wishes to stay faithful to the pre-analytic vision of this discipline. Ecological economics 
thus conflicts with the ontology of critical realism. 
 
 
5. Materiality / Who acts? 
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As I intended to show, Brown‘s notion of collective events and his critique of critical realism 
from positions of systematic dialectics is connected with the argument that we can‘t abstract 
from social practice when we think about the persistence of a given socio-economic system, 
formulated also in Wittgenstein‘s late work (Brown 2007, 512–513). As far as the notion of 
practice is essentially connected with our conception of social agency, this statement opens up 
two interdependent sets of questions: 
 
1) Who are social actors? Is the scope of social agency restricted solely on human 
beings? Is there any room for non-human actors? 
2) What is the role of materiality in persistence of a system? Are material objects 
mobilised in social relations to actively engage in persistence of a given system? 
 
By using Bruno Latour‘s Actor-network-theory (ANT), my contention is that from 
environmental perspective a) social (or economic) agency cannot be restricted on human 
beings, and b) material objects are actively engaged in persistence of given socio-economic 
system. This picture contrasts the social ontology of critical realism, where the agency is 
granted only to humans and social world is on an ontological level radically distinguished 
from nature (Lawson 2006, 495; Lee 2012, 10; Morgan 2014, 12). Exclusion of non-human 
agency is however present also in Brown‘s systematic dialectics (Brown 2007, 504). 
 
A socio-economic actor in critical realist‘s social ontology is simply understood as human 
actor who possesses intentional attitudes.
7
 Social reality is thus at least partly dependant on 
human beings and in the end they are the ultimate creators of social sphere, for it is being 
constructed upon their intentional states, similarly to John Searle‘s ontology presented in The 
Construction of Social Reality (1995). Human beings possess free will, that enables them to 
always act otherwise than what is prescribed in established social order, which explains why 
social reality is an unpredictable open system.  
 
The agency of other entities is not discussed – they are just mere parts of surrounding 
environment, in terminology of critical realism called structure: ―Much like sex during the 
Victorian period, objects are nowhere to be said and everywhere to be felt. They exist, 
naturally, but they are never given a thought, a social thought. Like humble servants, they live 
                                                 
7 See e.g. Morgan (2014, 12). 
Lukáš Likavčan: Reconsidering critical realism: an environmentalist’s perspective 
14 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
on the margins of the social doing most of the work but never allowed to be represented as 
such‖ (Latour 2007, 73). The problem here is that the distinction between actor and 
environment is relative to particular perspective (however, it is not arbitrary) and is a matter 
of historical and cultural change. A strict definition of social actor in critical realism can be 
contested by the idea of materiality – ―the notion that social existence involves not only actors 
and social relations but also objects― (Pinch & Swedberg 2008, 1). 
 
Let me pose a question: Where exactly social practice (including science) happens? Surely in 
a material world and by means of material objects (Konopásek 2008; Latour 1993, 24; Latour 
1998, 436–437). Moreover, these objects are not passive, they actively take part in social 
practice as actors. Why? Our life in a material world is negotiated not only between humans 
and collectives of humans, but also between us and objects in nature. That is precisely the 
case of Typhoon Haiyan from my introductory notes. The global ecosystem states through 
events like this the conditions under which an existence of human society is possible. The 
question of our relations towards objects is thus not just a question for natural sciences – it is 
at the same time the social and political question. The spread of social reaches new frontiers, 
far beyond the borders of human collectives. 
 
Critical realism sticks to an old-fashioned sociological account in which social is understood 
as a distinct dimension, structure or order. Social is some special feature that makes an object 
an inhabitant of ―social‖ world, it is a differentia specifica of an independent ontological 
level, that distinguishes it from another levels, such as geological, biological, chemical etc. It 
is a kind of a substance, a special stuff – similar to Aristotelian ether, as I have already 
mentioned. What is Latour‘s alternative? To use his own words, „in the alternative view, 
‗social‘ is not some glue that could fix everything including what the other glues cannot fix; it 
is what is glued together by many other types of connectors― (Latour 2007, 5). Society does 
not simply exists – it is repeatedly elaborated; assembled and re-assembled: ―the social is not 
yet made― (Ibid, 47). Practice – real-world material practice that mobilise wide range of actors 
– is an essential glue that makes continual becoming of social possible. Social sciences – 
including economics – then come to be studies of associations; practices of tracing the 
connections. 
 
The materiality of social can be in fact best acknowledged in economic science – as theories 
from Aristotle and Xenophon to political economy of 19
th
 century or (perhaps in many ways 
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controversial) school of Physiocrats indeed show us (Swedberg 2008, 60; 68–69). For 
example, Smith gives a very detailed account of wealth in his Wealth of Nations (1776) in 
terms of physical objects that constitute the wealth (Ibid, 69). He also emphasises that a real 
source of wealth is in labour, i.e. in physical practice conducted in a material world (Ibid, 70). 
Ecological economics just extended the realm of relevant material objects and processes that 
are genuine parts of economy to other natural objects and their assemblages, such as in the 
case of introducing ecosystem as a framework in which economic metabolism is situated.  
 
Material objects are genuine sources of persistence of social. No abstract, underlying social 
force is needed, because social is made up and sticks together by means of a-social. As Latour 
(2007) speaks out: ―It is always things – and I now mean this last word literally – which, in 
practice, lend their ‗steely‘ quality to the hapless ‗society‘. So, in effect, what sociologists 
mean by the ‗power of society‘ is not society itself – that would be magical indeed – but some 
sort of summary for all the entities already mobilized…― (68). The same position can be 
found in Brown‘s work: „Contra critical realism, social relations are not ‗deeper‘ than, 
underlying or interacting with, social activities. Rather, there is one single actuality to which 
concepts of ‗social relation‘, ‗social activity‘ and ‗social structure‘ all refer, albeit with 
differences in emphasis― (Brown 2007, 513–514). To make social connections strong enough 
solely by means of virtual social forces would mean to invest a tremendous amount of effort, 
which is not possible in our ―modern‖ world. Instead, non-human agencies have to be 
massively mobilised in order to maintain such a large network, as in the case of global 
economy.  
 
The very definition of actor in ANT springs out from the acceptance of materiality as inherent 
part of social. Actor (or actant)
8
 is ―any thing that does modify a state of affairs by making a 
difference‖ (Latour 2007, 71). Why? That is declared in another quotation from Latour‘s 
Reassembling the Social: „If action is limited a priori to what ‗intentional‘, ‗meaningful‘ 
humans do, it is hard to see how a hammer, a basket, a door closer, a cat, a rug, a mug, a list, 
or a tag could act. They might exist in the domain of ‗material‘ ‗causal‘ relations, but not in 
the ‗reflexive‘ ‗symbolic‘ domain of social relations‖ (Ibid). 
 
                                                 
8 ANT has borrowed the term „actant― from literal science, where agency is distributed to various exotic entities, 
e.g. dwarfs. See Latour (2007, 54–55) 
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Once objects intervene into our well-established notion of social, the image of social agency 
is disrupted. Action is not a domain of conscious human beings, it is distributed through the 
whole network. To make an event happen, a large set of entities has to be mobilised. Take an 
example of a flight of an airplane. Who exactly drives the plane? A pilot – that would be a 
typical answer. But let me examine this case in detail. To make a flight happen, we surely 
need to invoke a large body of another actors – navigators, communication systems, airports, 
fossil fuels, engineers etc. All these entities are in action while a plane flies above our heads, 
they are simultaneously engaged in action – an agency is distributed between all of them 
(Callon 2008, 34–36). An action is overtaken: ―... the very word actor directs our attention to 
a complete dislocation of the action, warning us that it is not a coherent, controlled, well-
rounded, and clean-edged affair. By definition, action is dislocated. Action is borrowed, 
distributed, suggested, influenced, dominated, betrayed, translated‖ (Latour 2007, 46). 
 
Non-human actors are in critical realism a priori excluded. But such an exclusion is 
unjustified, once we see how important objects are in social order. It resembles the 
cartographer that is trying to sketch a continent by means of easily grasped geometrical 
figures (rectangles, hexagons, lines…), ignoring all the nuances of the seashores (Latour 
2007, 23). In his effort, he tries to push reality to fit into preordained forms, and thus he 
violates the shape of an object he describes. To stay faithful to the reality, we need – as the 
cartographer – to give up our well-defined concepts and ground them in the inconsistences of 
the world, populated by actors of many kinds. The final justification of our shift towards 
broader notion of actor is then the following one: 
 
―... we are going to accept as full-blown actors entities that were explicitly 
excluded from collective existence by more than one hundred years of social 
explanation. The reasons are twofold: first, because the basic social skills 
provide only one tiny subset of the associations making up societies; second, 
because the supplement of force which seems to reside in the invocation of a 
social tie is, at best, a convenient shorthand and, at worst, nothing more than a 
tautology‖ (Latour 2007, 69). 
 
Now, recall the pre-analytic vision of ecological economics: ―the human economy is 
embedded in nature, and economic processes are also always natural processes in the sense 
that they can be seen as biological, physical and chemical processes and transformations…‖ 
Lukáš Likavčan: Reconsidering critical realism: an environmentalist’s perspective 
17 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
(Røpke 2004, 294).‖ The abasement of economy to the level of natural processes is a 
complementary motion to upheaving material objects on the social level. These two motions 
meet each other in a final picture of one shared reality of heterogeneous entities – a sort of flat 
ontology. Environmental point of view thus contradicts hierarchical ontology of critical 
realism, but is well-suited to engage in resolving problems that are not scientific in an 
ordinary sense – so called post-normal problems. But that is the story of a concluding chapter. 
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6. Conclusion: A non-modernist rationale 
Once we know that social is not something only loosely connected to the Nature, a new 
meaning is rendered to this word. By social (in an old-fashion modernistic sense), we should 
mean from now only a small portion of entities and relations that are genuinely intertwined in 
actor-network, in a collective. The old term of social only ―offers convenient shorthand to 
designate all the ingredients already accepted in the collective realm― (Latour 2007, 11). But 
the totality of assemblage of social is significantly larger, as the last chapter intended to show. 
 
In his ontological vision, Latour follows the steps of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Not 
only per accident he has sometimes described ANT as an ―actant-rhizome theory‖, where the 
term ―rhizome‖ refers to one of the central terms discussed in Deleuze‘s / Guattari‘s A 
Thousand Plateaus (1987). The ratio of their ontology – called geophilosophy – is in 
―thinking in association with, and as the affirmation of, the diversity and multiplicity of the 
continuous becomings of a fluctuating natural reality… it seeks to eliminate the traditional 
dichotomy separating humanity (as subject) and nature (as object) by "stretching out a plane 
of immanence…"‖ (Hayden 2008, 29). 
 
Nature and society are in this sense inadequate modernist categories that collapse into each 
other. Latour shows how the modern constitution – the ontological model of modernist project 
– was settled up by the practice of purification, an intellectual work of separating human 
activity from non-human world and shaping strict dual categories of culture and nature 
(Latour 1993, 10–11; 30–31). Work of purification (as manifested for example in Cartesian 
dualism) sorts out objects and subjects and allocates them to the reigns where they ―naturally‖ 
belong; it makes reality well-defined and comprehensible. On the other hand, the precondition 
of existence of modern society is a simultaneous work of translation (or mediation), that 
blends natural and human bodies and creates hybrid networks, in which things are mobilized 
in order to petrify and extend social construction: 
 
―Despite its human construction, the Leviathan [social construction] infinitely 
surpasses the humans who created it, for in its pores, its vessels, its tissues, it 
mobilizes the countless goods and objects that give it consistency and 
durability. Yet despite the solidity procured by the mobilization of things (as 
revealed by the work of mediation), we alone are the ones who constitute it 
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freely by the sheer force of our reasoning – we poor, naked, unarmed citizens 
(as demonstrated by the work of purification‖ (Ibid, 31). 
 
This is the asymmetry of modernism. Nature inevitably invades into the pure social structure, 
but the clear cut between natural and cultural pertains. To regain a symmetrical position, we 
need to do an anthropological turn – to direct the instruments of ethnography at our own 
modern world, to decolonize the West from its own prejudice of modernism; the prejudice of 
a Great Divide between Us and Them (Ibid, 97). Indeed, last decades of ethnographic research 
have turned its attention towards the modern world and helped to clarify that in fact, we are 
the same as pre-moderns, and so that no Great Division has been ever established.
9
 The only 
difference between moderns and pre-moderns is in a scope of mobilization of objects and a 
level of proliferation of hybrid networks (Ibid, 105). However, this is not an ontological 
difference, but just a question of scale. 
 
If we have never been modern, so our science has never been a modern one as well. A modern 
science can be imagined as a normal science from Thomas Kuhn‘s Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962). This idea depicts science as a rigorous activity conducted in a well-
established, consistent framework. In a period of normal science (in contrast to the situation 
of scientific revolution), fundamental propositions of given paradigmatic theory are not 
contested and innovations are strictly controlled. Disciplinary boundaries are also narrowly 
defined and research problems / areas overlap only exceptionally (Kuhn 1993, 19–20; 36–37). 
Normal science resembles an activity of puzzle-solving, as if every piece of scientific 
knowledge were on a table, as if the task of science were merely to rearrange the pieces in an 
adequate manner (Strand 2010, 623). 
 
Critical realism accepts the framework of modern, normal science, for its ontology accepts 
nature/culture dichotomy, where problems and objects are clearly sorted out. From this point 
of view, it is incompatible with ecological economics, which has intuitively closer to flat 
ontology of actor-networks. But there is also another interesting aspect of critical realism. The 
argument against strict causal regularities is in fact within the modernist mainstream 
economic paradigm, for it adheres to the methodological obsession with regularities. The 
resistance against and insistence on existence of strict causal regularities in social order are 
                                                 
9 Just to mention Arjun Appadurai‘s brilliant monography The Social Life of Things (1986). 
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nothing more than two sides of the same coin. What we have to do is not to get rid of an 
obsession with formal-deductive method, but of the notion of scientific fact based solely on 
identifying recurrent courses of events in reality. There are numerous mechanisms generating 
scientific facts (granted there are many types of associations) and our task is not to exclude 
any of these mechanisms from any field of research. It means – besides other things – that 
strict causal regularities can be found also in social reality, as well as other procedures 
generating scientific facts. 
 
Historically, society was understood as a realm of contingency, while nature as a domain of 
iron causal rules. Now, we ended up with only one level of reality, which is a realm of 
contingency and regularity at the same time. So yes, it is true that surprises happen and some 
events are spontaneous. But it is important to point out that surprises occur in both what could 
be coined as social and as natural reality in an old modernist constitution of world. Corruption 
of fences between nature and culture does not rule out the existence of strict regularities. One 
and the same assemblage of heterogeneous actors can display causal regularities in one 
respect and unpredictable events in other. 
 
For this reason, it is necessary to look up for another vision of science, one that resembles 
more an unending fluid practice than a finished and solid framework. Such is the concept of 
post-normal science, where scientific work is a process of continual arrangement and re-
arrangement of entities, as any other social (hence material) practice. In this process, we cope 
with problems involving irreducible complexities and uncertainties, such as the case of global 
climate change or biosafety issues (Funtowicz & Strand 2007, 265). These problems can be 
labelled as post-normal problems. At the same time, they are non-modern problems in the 
sense that they can‘t be grasped in the modernist scientific framework. The reason is that 
these problems are complex, i.e. they can be described using multiple and mutually irreducible 
narratives and dictionaries (Diaz-Maurin & Kovacic 2015, 211).  
 
But when we talk about uncertainty in complex issues, we do not talk about global 
uncertainty, a total arbitrariness and unpredictability of behaviour of the system that is 
studied. Uncertainties arise also in systems whose general mechanisms can be described in 
terms of strict regularities, as the case of climate change shows us. We know pretty well how 
the climate behaves and what are some key factors influencing this behaviour. But still, we 
are at odds once we are trying to be fully precise and detailed in description of climate 
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patterns and in prediction of the future state of affairs, for the problem is a complex one. That 
resembles the idea presented in Brown (2007): from the individual perspective, a system may 
seem to behave largely unpredictably, but once we take a system-wide perspective, some 
regularities start to occur before our eyes (508). 
 
An insistence on complexity of social can be found also in critical realism (Morgan 2014, 16). 
However, it comes to this conclusion by using an old-fashioned ontology that sticks to the 
hierarchical image of universe and radically different ontological layers. It cannot bring 
together fossil fuel resources, typhoons, politics and economic behaviour of consumers. 
Perhaps, it seems to be a marginal problem, but when we come to the question of to what 
extent some events are strictly regular, we cannot accept critical realism, for it exorcise a 
cornerstone of our understanding of global ecosystem, in which economic activity occurs and 
which is thus necessary for our comprehension of the nature of economy as such. 
 
Now, to sum up the main theses of the paper, I argued that: 
 
1) In ecological economics, we need to presuppose the existence of strict regularities, 
which are rejected by critical realism in the realm of socio-economical relationships. 
2) The notion of social actor is in critical realism too narrow to include some key 
economic actors – notably the material, non-human parts of the environment in which 
the economy is localised. 
 
Let me conclude with one final remark. The insistence on materiality of economic processes 
is tremendously important once we see how it influences our notion of social norms and 
policies. Ecological economists inform us about the nature, and thus about limits of real-world 
economies as aggregates of specific social practices. Consequently, they pose boundaries in 
terms of which our economic activity can be sustainably realized, and hence they provide a 
general framework for production of social and political norms that guide our economic 
activities. Ecological economics is in this sense engaged into the process of generating certain 
politics (or regimes) of value (Appadurai 1986, 57) and its purpose is to propose and criticise 
particular norms and normative systems from its distinct standpoint. Critical realism pleads 
for similar engagement of social sciences. But it does not purport a sufficient groundings for 
its justification. 
  
Lukáš Likavčan: Reconsidering critical realism: an environmentalist’s perspective 
22 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to thank Jakub Mácha for discussing Wittgenstein‘s argument in On Certainty 
and Václav Krajňanský for careful proofreading of the paper. This paper was created in 
collaboration with Department of Environmental Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Masaryk University. Supported from the project MUNI/A/1299/2014 ―Contemporary 





Appadurai, A. (1986) Introduction: commodities and the politics of value. In Appadurai, A. 
(ed.) The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. pp. 3–63. 
 
Boulding, K. E. (1966) The economics of the coming Spaceship Earth. In Jarrett, H. (ed.) 
Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy: Essays from the Sixth RFF Forum. Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press. pp. 3–14. 
 
Brown, A. (2007) Reorienting critical realism: a system-wide perspective on the capitalist 
economy. In Journal of Economic Methodology, 14 (4). pp. 499–519. 
 
Callon, M. (2008) Economic Markets and the Rise of Interactive Agencements: From 
Prosthetic Agencies to Habilitated Agencies. In Pinch, T. – Swedberg, R. (eds.) Living in a 
Material World. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. pp. 29–56. 
 
Carrington, D. – Vidal, J. (2013) Is climate change to blame for Typhoon Haiyan? [online]. In 




Carrington, D. – Mason, R. (2013) Cameron links typhoon Haiyan to climate change. 
[online]. In The Guardian, 16 November 2013. 
<http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/16/david-cameron-climate-change-
typhoon-haiyan> 
Lukáš Likavčan: Reconsidering critical realism: an environmentalist’s perspective 
23 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
 
Daly, H. E. – Farley, J. (2011) Ecological Economics. Principles and Applications. 
Washington: Island Press. 
 
Diaz-Maurin, F. – Kovacic, Z. (2015) The unresolved controversy over nuclear power: A new 
approach from complexity theory. In Global Environmental Change, 31. pp. 207–216. 
 
Elsner, J. B., et al. (2012) Sensitivity of limiting hurricane intensity to ocean warmth. In 
Geophysical Research Letters, 39. 
 
Francis, J. A. – Vavrus, S. J. (2012) Evidence linking Arctic amplification to extreme weather 
in mid-latitudes. In Geophysical Research Letters, 39. 
 
Funtowicz, S. – Ravetz, J. R. (1993) The worth of a songbird: ecological economics as a post-
normal science. In Ecological Economics, 10. pp. 197–207. 
 
Funtowicz, S. – Strand, R. (2007) Models of Science and Policy. In Traavik, T. – Lim, L.C. 
(eds.) Biosafety First: Holistic Approaches to Risk and Uncertainty in Genetic Engineering 
and Genetically Modified Organisms. Trondheim: Tapir. pp. 263-278. 
 
Hall, C. A. S. – Murphy, D. J. (2011) Energy return on investment, peak oil, and the end of 
economic growth. In Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1219. pp. 52–72. 
 
Hayden, P. (2008) Gilles Deleuze and Naturalism: A Convergence with Ecological Theory 
and Politics. In Herzogenrath, B. (ed.) An [Un]Likely Alliance: Thinking Environment[s] with 
Deleuze|Guattari. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 23–45. 
 
Hirsch, C. – DesRoches, C. T. (2009) Cambridge social ontology: an interview with Tony 
Lawson. In Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 2 (1). pp. 100-122. 
 
Holling, C. S. (1986) The resilience of terrestrial ecosystems: local surprise and global 
change. In William C. Clark, W. C. – Munn, R. E. (eds.) Sustainable Development of the 
Biosphere. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 292-317. 
 
Lukáš Likavčan: Reconsidering critical realism: an environmentalist’s perspective 
24 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
Johanisová, N. (2014) Ekologická ekonomie: vybrané kapitoly. Brno: Masarykova univerzita. 
Kerschner, C. (2010) Economic de-growth vs. steady-state economy. In Journal of Cleaner 
Production, 18. pp. 544–551. 
 
Kerschner, C., et al. (2013) Economic vulnerability to Peak Oil. In Global Environmental 
Change, 23. pp. 1424–1433. 
 
Kerschner, C. (2015) Peak-Oil. In D‗Alisa, G. – Demaria, F. – Kallis, G. (eds.) Degrowth: A 
Vocabulary for a New Paradigm. London: Routledge. pp. 129–132. 
 
Konopásek, Z. (2008) Making Thinking Visible with Atlas.ti: Computer Assisted Qualitative 
Analysis as Textual Practices. [online]. In Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung / Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research, 9 (2).  
<http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/420/910>. 
 
Kuhn, T. S. (1993) Struktura vědeckých revolucí. Praha: OIKOYMENH. 
 
Lawson, T. (2006) The nature of heterodox economics. In Cambridge Journal of Economics, 
30. pp. 483–505. 
 
Latour, B. (1993) We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. 
 
Latour, B. (1998) How to be Iconophilic in Art, Science and Religion? In Jones, C. – Galison, 
P. (eds.) Picturing Science, Producing Art. London: Routledge. pp. 418–440. 
 
Latour, B. (2007) Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-network-theory. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Lee, F. (2012) Critical realism, grounded theory, and theory construction in heterodox 
economics. [online]. In MPRA, 40341. <http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40341/>. 
 
Morgan, J. (2014) Critical realism as a social ontology for economics. In Lee, F. and Cronin, 
B. (eds.) Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Heterodox Economics. [draft]. 
 
Lukáš Likavčan: Reconsidering critical realism: an environmentalist’s perspective 
25 
DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE 
Nuccitelli, D. (2013) Will extreme weather like super typhoon Haiyan become the new norm? 




Pinch, T. – Swedberg, R. (2008) Introduction. In Pinch, T. – Swedberg, R. (eds.) Living in a 
Material World. Cmabridge (MA): MIT Press. pp. 1–26. 
 
Røpke, I. (2004) The early history of modern ecological economics. In Ecological Economics, 
50. pp. 293–314. 
 
Searle, J. R. (1995) The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Scheidel, A. – Sorman, A. H. (2012) Energy transitions and the global land rush: Ultimate 
drivers and persistent consequences. In Global Environmental Change, 22. pp. 588–595. 
 
Spash, C. L. (1999) The Development of Environmental Thinking in Economics. In 
Environmental Values, 8. pp. 413–435. 
 
Spash, C. L. (2012) New foundations for ecological economics. In Ecological Economics, 77. 
pp. 36–47. 
 
Strand, R. (2010) Postnormal Science. In Guston, D. (ed.) Encyclopedia of nanoscience and 
society. Thousand Oaks (CA): SAGE Publications. pp. 622-624. 
 
Swedberg, R. (2008) The Centrality of Materiality: Economic Theorizing from Xenophon to 
Home Economics and Beyond. In Pinch, T. – Swedberg, R. (eds.) Living in a Material World. 
Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. pp. 57–87. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1969) On Certainty. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Wittgenstein, L. (1972) Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. 
